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Non-technical summary 
The most prominent instrument of current European climate policy is the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) which is operating at the installation level in a “warm-up” phase since 
2005. More recently, the EU has proposed to strengthen the European ETS by linking the 
scheme to emerging trading systems beyond Europe in order to more cost-efficiently achieve 
its climate policy objectives. At the same time, countries like Canada, Japan or Australia are 
considering the set up of domestic ETS with the intention of linking up to the European 
scheme. The EU ETS may thus form the nucleus for a gradually expanding company-based 
emissions trading system at the global level. Given the coexistent EU priorities with respect to 
competitiveness of European industries and international emissions regulation at the company 
level, this paper assesses the efficiency and competitiveness implications of linking the EU 
ETS to emerging trading schemes outside Europe.  
Employing both economic theory and a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of 
the global economy, in this paper we (i) analytically derive the efficiency aspects of 
integrating emissions trading schemes from a partial market perspective, (ii) numerically 
analyze the aggregate welfare impacts of linking the EU ETS and (iii) explicitly assess the 
economy-wide and sectoral competitiveness effects of developing supra-European emissions 
trading schemes in the year 2020. 
While a stylized partial-market analysis suggests that the integration of trading systems is 
always beneficial in efficiency terms, our applied general equilibrium approach shows that the 
aggregate welfare impacts of linking the EU ETS are rather limited. We further find that the 
trade-based competitiveness effects of linking the European ETS crucially depend on the 
linked trading system: Although EU economy-wide competitiveness varies only moderately 
across linking scenarios, the sectoral decomposition of these aggregate effects shows that 
European industries are much more sensitive to the linking constellation. Regarding the 
international trade impacts for non-EU countries, we find that the linking candidates have 
very heterogeneous incentives to join the European trading system, which range from 
pronounced competitiveness improvements for Canada to substantial competitiveness losses 
for Japan. Our sensitivity analysis assuming a stricter allowance allocation within regional 
trading systems suggests, however, that a more efficient design of domestic ETS can boost the 
overall prospects for establishing supra-European emissions trading schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
In March 2000, the European Council agreed at the Lisbon summit to make the European 
Union (EU) the most competitive economy of the world (EU, 2000). At the same time, the EU 
pursues ambitious climate policies in order to fulfil its emissions reduction targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol and to limit global climate change to two degrees Celsius in the long run 
(UNFCCC, 1997; EU, 2007a).  
The most prominent instrument of current European climate policy is the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) which is operating at the installation level in a “warm-up” phase since 
2005 (EU, 2003). Thereby, the EU has established a flexible climate policy instrument at the 
company level independently of the Kyoto Protocol (facilitating both international emissions 
trading between Annex B governments and project-based emissions reductions in developing 
countries via the Clean Development Mechanism, CDM). More recently, the EU has proposed 
to strengthen the European ETS by linking the scheme to emerging trading systems beyond 
Europe in order to more cost-efficiently achieve its climate policy objectives (EU, 2007a). 
The EU ETS may thus form the nucleus for a gradually expanding company-based emissions 
trading system at the global level. Reflecting the coexistent EU priorities concerning the 
competitiveness of European industries and international emissions regulation at the company 
level, this paper presents an efficiency and international trade analysis of future supra-
European emissions trading schemes. 
At present, several non-EU countries are contemplating the set up of domestic ETS at the 
national and regional level with the intention of linking up to the European scheme. In the 
short run, the already mature emissions trading schemes of Norway and Switzerland – which 
are designed similarly to the EU ETS – can be expected to be linked to the European system 
(Sterk, 2005) until 2010. In the mid-term perspective up to 2020, several parties having 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol – such as Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation – may also 
have incentives to join the EU ETS: Canada is already promoting the Large Final Emitter 
System to cover energy-intensive companies accounting for almost 50 percent of total 
Canadian greenhouse gas emissions (CEPA Environmental Registry, 2005). Japan has started 
the Pilot Project of a Domestic Emissions Trading Scheme on a voluntary basis, with circa 30 
private companies participating in the program (Japanese Ministry of the Environment, 2004). 
Moreover, initial exploratory discussions on the potential linkage of trading schemes have 
already been held between the EU, Canada and Japan (EU, 2005; EU-Japan Centre for 
Industrial Cooperation, 2006). Also Russia may have incentives to develop a domestic 
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emissions trading system in order to be linked to the European scheme and to exploit a larger 
market for the sale of excess emissions permits, so-called “Hot Air”. Finally, linking the EU 
ETS to emerging schemes in Australia and the United States – which have so far not ratified 
the Kyoto-Protocol – could be considered as a first step in integrating both countries into an 
international climate policy regime. Indeed, Australia and United States are already promoting 
domestic emissions trading schemes: In the U.S., the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative – 
being pushed by nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states – aims at establishing a regional 
trading system (RGGI, 2006). In Australia, the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Scheme is already operating at the state level (New South Wales Government, 2006) and most 
recently, Australian state premiers have released initial proposals for a national cap and trade 
system starting in 2010 (Point Carbon, 2006). To sum up, there are strong signals for 
emissions trading schemes to be established in non-EU countries and to be potentially linked 
to the European scheme by 2020.  
Previous quantitative economic analyses have focused on efficiency aspects (see e.g. 
Böhringer et al., 2005) and competitiveness implications of the current European trading 
scheme (Kemfert et al., 2005; Klepper and Peterson, 2004; Peterson 2006a) in applied partial 
and general equilibrium frameworks. However, only Peterson (2006b) addresses the 
competitiveness implications of EU emissions regulation explicitly by employing a trade-
based competitiveness indicator. Regarding the linkage of the European ETS to emerging 
schemes outside Europe, a first economic impact assessment is presented by Anger (2006) 
within a partial equilibrium modelling framework. Further contributions examine economic 
and institutional aspects of linking the EU ETS internationally in a qualitative manner only 
(Kruger et al., 2007; Sterk et al, 2006; Blyth and Bosi, 2004). Against this background, the 
contribution of this paper is threefold: Employing both economic theory and a large-scale 
computable general equilibrium model of the global economy, we (i) analytically derive the 
efficiency aspects of integrating emissions trading schemes from a partial market perspective, 
(ii) numerically analyze the aggregate welfare impacts of linking the EU ETS and (iii) 
explicitly assess the economy-wide and sectoral competitiveness effects of developing supra-
European emissions trading schemes in the year 2020. 
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical background of our 
analysis. In section 3, we present the numerical framework underlying our quantitative impact 
assessment. Section 4 introduces policy scenarios of linking the EU ETS internationally. 
Section 5 summarizes our quantitative simulation results. In section 6, we conclude. 
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2 Theoretical background 
In this section, we present a simple analytical model of the emissions market in order to lay 
out the theoretical background for our numerical analysis of linking the European ETS. For 
this purpose, we first analyze the general efficiency aspects of international emissions trading 
and subsequently assess the emissions market implications of linking alternative trading 
systems. 
Following the stylized framework of Anger (2006), R regions are assumed (r=1,...,R) to 
commit to individual emissions targets (e.g. targets under the Kyoto Protocol), yielding an 
absolute emissions budget rE  for each region. Abatement costs of those sectors covered by a 
domestic emissions trading scheme (in the following referred to as ETS sectors) and the 
remaining non-covered sectors (in the following referred to as NETS sectors) in each region 
are denoted by ACrETS(e) and ACrNETS(e), respectively. Abatement cost functions are 
decreasing, convex and differentiable in emissions e. Total abatement costs ACr(Er) are the 
sum of the sectoral costs ACrETS(erETS) and ACrNETS(erNETS).  
For all regions – with binding emissions targets (such as Annex B parties of the Kyoto 
Protocol) and without any commitments (such as CDM host countries) – cost minimization 
and profit maximization with respect to ETSre and 
NETS
re  yields the following first-order 
condition: 
( )
ETS NETS
r r r
ETS NETS ETS NETS
r r r r
AC AC AC
e e e e
σ ∂ ∂ ∂= − = − = −∂ ∂ ∂ +  (1) 
For each region and sector, this cost-efficient solution implies that marginal abatement costs 
equal the permit price σ  and are thus equalized across all emissions sources. Optimal 
emissions can then be derived as 
* **, ,ETS NETSr r rE e e , where 
* ** ETS NETS
r r rE e e= + . The difference 
between the total emissions budget rE  and aggregate optimal emissions
*
rE  yields the optimal 
total trade volume in emissions permits. 
2.1 An international emissions trading scheme 
We consider an international emissions trading scheme consisting of two regions, 1 and 2. 
Interregional trading of emissions permits is feasible only for a segment of each economy, i.e. 
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only for the ETS sectors covered by the trading system.1 We denote ETSre  the regional 
emissions target for ETS sectors, i.e. an assigned emissions cap or the number of allocated 
permits. Figure 1 illustrates the efficiency implications from trading emissions – in the 
absence of the CDM – in terms of compliance costs for the fulfillment of the regional 
emissions targets. The figure presents the corresponding economic impacts for the ETS 
sectors of the two regions that have (for simplicity linear) marginal abatement costs 
1 1( )
ETS ETSMAC e  and 2 2( )ETS ETSMAC e  depending on regional emissions levels. We assume higher 
marginal abatement costs for region 1 than for region 2, equal maximum emissions for the 
two regions and equal regional emissions targets for the covered ETS sectors, amounting to 50 
percent of their maximum emissions.  
 
 
Figure 1: Sectoral efficiency gains in an international emissions trading scheme 
 
According to Figure 1, the initial regional allocation of emissions permits 1 2( , )
ETS ETSe e to the 
covered ETS sectors, corresponding to a total emissions ceiling of 1 2ETSE + , implies economically 
inefficient regional emissions levels as the associated marginal abatement costs differ between 
                                                 
1 Anger (2006) shows that such a sectoral restriction of international emissions trading coupled with a generous 
allocation of emissions permits can cause large inefficiencies. 
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the two regions. By means of international emissions trading, the high-cost (low-cost) region 
1 (2) imports (exports) emissions permits from (to) the other region, thus increasing 
(reducing) its emissions. The resulting international permit price *12σ  equalizes marginal 
abatement costs and yields the optimal emissions levels ( )* *1 2,ETS ETSe e . As a consequence, 
international trading activities generate efficiency gains both for region 1 – due to avoided 
abatement costs exceeding permit import costs (equal to area A) – and for region 2 – due to 
larger permit export revenues than associated abatement costs (equal to area B). 
2.2 Linking of alternative trading schemes 
We extend the bilateral perspective of Figure 1 by introducing an additional region that may 
be linked to the joint trading scheme of region 1 and 2 (both regions have the same 
characteristics as in Figure 1). Hereby, we distinguish the following two cases: linking to a 
high-cost region (3) with marginal abatement costs 3 3( )ETS ETSMAC e  and linking to a low-cost 
region (4) with marginal abatement costs 4 4( )
ETS ETSMAC e . Both regions are assumed to exhibit 
the same maximum amount of emissions as the joint scheme of region 1 and 2. Analogously 
to the existing trading system, the linking candidates restrict emissions trading to their ETS 
sectors which face identical emissions targets 3
ETSe  and 4
ETSe amounting to 50 percent of their 
maximum emissions. These ceilings correspond to the overall emissions target of the existing 
trading scheme 1 2ETSE +  which features an aggregate marginal abatement cost function 
1 2 1 2( )
ETS ETSMAC E+ + . Figure 2 illustrates the efficiency aspects for ETS sectors of linking an 
additional region to the existing trading scheme of region 1 and 2. 
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Figure 2: Additional efficiency gains from linking emissions trading schemes  
 
In the case of linking the high-cost region 3 to the existing trading scheme, we observe that 
the initial allocation of emissions permits 1 2ETSE +  and 3
ETSe  to the covered ETS sectors again 
implies economically inefficient regional emissions levels. However, by means of 
international emissions trading the higher-cost region 3 may import permits from the lower-
cost existing scheme, yielding an increased international permit price of *123σ  as compared to 
*
12σ  and optimal emissions levels ( *1 2ETSE + , *3ETSe ) with equalized marginal abatement costs. 
Compared to the initial allocation, in the new equilibrium region 3 increases its emissions 
while the existing scheme reduces pollution by the same amount. Thus, emissions trading 
activities induce efficiency gains for both the existing scheme (equal to area C) and region 3 
(equal to area D).  
In contrast, linking to low-cost region 4 (initial permit allocation 4
ETSe ) implies that this region 
will export emissions permits to the higher-cost joint scheme of regions 1 and 2. These 
trading activities yield a decreased international permit price of *124σ  and optimal emissions 
levels ( **1 2
ETSE + ,
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the joint scheme. This linking strategy generates efficiency gains both for the existing scheme 
(equal to area E) and region 4 (equal to area F). Thus, for the existing trading scheme linking 
to a high-cost or low-cost region implies positive incentives of a different magnitude – 
illustrated by the two areas C and E. In our case, the option to link to a low-cost candidate 
appears to be more preferable for the joint scheme, as the prospects of avoiding abatement 
costs by permit imports dominate the potential net benefits from exporting permits. Clearly, 
these incentives vary with the marginal abatement costs of the existing scheme and the 
respective linking candidates.  
Our stylized partial market analysis suggests that – independently of the cost characteristics of 
a region to be linked with an existing scheme – the integration of trading systems yields 
economic efficiency gains for all participating regions. The reason is an increased where-
flexibility of regional emissions abatement through an international linkage. Our stylized 
theoretical framework deliberately abstracts from real-world conditions regarding the regional 
heterogeneity of emissions levels, permit allocation and marginal abatement costs. In the next 
section we therefore present a numerical economic assessment of linking emissions trading 
schemes based on empirical data. Our applied general equilibrium model framework further 
enables us to analyze the associated indirect economic impacts that surpass the emissions 
market, affecting macroeconomic variables such as domestic production and international 
trade flows. 
 
3 Numerical framework 
In the following, we present the quantitative framework of our analysis. We first introduce 
our modeling approach and will then briefly discuss prerequisites and inputs for our policy 
assessment. 
3.1 Modelling approach 
In order to quantify the macroeconomic impacts of linking the EU ETS to emerging trading 
schemes outside Europe, it is crucial to account for complexities such as detailed production 
structures and market interactions. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have 
become the standard tool for applied economy-wide analysis of policy measures (for surveys 
on applications to environmental policies see Conrad 1999, 2001). The main virtue of the 
CGE approach is its comprehensive representation of price-dependent market interactions 
based on rigorous microeconomic theory. The simultaneous explanation of the origin and 
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spending of agents' incomes makes it possible to address both economy-wide efficiency and 
distributional impacts of policy interference. 
For our numerical analysis, we build on the PACE model (Policy Assessment based on 
Computable Equilibrium), a large-scale CGE model of international energy use and global 
trade (Böhringer and Vogt, 2003). In order to conduct an international trade analysis and 
assess the corresponding competitiveness effects of linking the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, we adapt the core PACE model by explicitly modelling export flows and prices. 
The model reflects the key features of the European ETS and emerging non-EU trading 
schemes from a single country perspective: EU Member States and countries with domestic 
ETS outside Europe (linking candidates) are committed to specific carbon emissions 
constraints 2CO  which are agreed upon (e.g. under the Kyoto Protocol). Each of these 
countries must specify a cap E  and the allocation rule for free emissions allowances to 
energy-intensive installations in six downstream sectors that are eligible for international 
emissions trading (electricity, oil refineries, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, mineral 
industries and paper and pulp production). Assuming that the EU and non-EU emissions 
trading systems cover only energy-intensive industries implies that complementary domestic 
abatement policies are necessary for the non-covered sectors in order to comply with the 
remaining national emissions budget ( )ECO −2 .  
Figure 3 provides a diagrammatic structure of the generic open-economy model. A 
representative agent RAr in each region r is endowed with three primary factors: labour rL , 
capital rK , and fossil-fuel resources ,ff rQ  (used for fossil fuel production). The representative 
agent maximizes utility from consumption of a composite good Cr which combines demands 
for energy and non-energy commodities at a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES). 
Production Yir of commodities i in region r is captured by nested separable CES functions that 
describe the price-dependent use of capital, labour, energy and material in production. Carbon 
emissions are linked in fixed proportions to the emissions-relevant use of fossil fuels through 
carbon coefficients which are differentiated by the specific carbon content of fuels. Carbon 
abatement, thus, can take place by fuel switching or energy savings in production and final 
consumption.  
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Figure 3: Diagrammatic overview of the model structure 
 
The modelling of international trade is based on the Armington approach of product 
heterogeneity (Armington, 1969), so that domestic and foreign goods of the same variety are 
distinguished by their origin. All goods used on the domestic market in intermediate and final 
demand correspond to a CES composite Air that combines the domestically produced variety 
Yir and imports Mir of the same variety from other regions. Domestic production Yir either 
enters the formation of the Armington good Air or is exported (Xir) to other regions. Trade 
with other regions is represented by a set of horizontal export demand and import supply 
functions at exogenous world import and export prices. A balance of payment constraint, 
which is warranted through flexible exchange rates, incorporates the benchmark trade deficit 
or surplus. 
The model is based on consistent accounts of national production and consumption, trade and 
energy flows for 2001 as provided by the GTAP 6 database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
2006). A detailed description of our benchmark data sources can be found in Appendix 8.1. 
The corresponding model regions and sectors of our analysis are presented in Appendix 8.2. 
3.2 Prerequisites for the quantitative analysis 
In this section, we present the set of relevant inputs for our numerical analysis. We include 
data on emissions reduction targets, allocation of emissions allowances to the sectors covered 
by emissions trading schemes, CDM transaction costs and investment risk indicators.  
 
Xir
Air 
RAr 
Cir 
Mir   Other 
Regions 
Fossil fuel sectors, electricity, 
energy-intensive sectors, and other 
sectors 
Yir 
Region r 
L r K r Q ff,r 
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Emissions reduction targets and regional allowance allocation 
In order to analyze future climate policy strategies we have to assume emissions reduction 
commitments of the participating regions in the year 2020: Motivated by the ambitious future 
European climate policy goals, the EU (having committed to an EU-wide reduction of 8 
percent under the Kyoto Protocol) is assumed to commit to a 20 percent reduction target vs. 
1990 levels in 2020 (EU, 2007b). To this aim the heterogeneous regional Kyoto targets for 
EU Member States (as manifested by the EU Burden Sharing Agreement) are decreased by 13 
percent in 2020. Given the assumed leadership role of European climate policy, those non-EU 
linking candidates having ratified the Kyoto Protocol (Canada, Japan and Russia) are assumed 
to tighten their Kyoto target by only 5 percent under a future climate policy agreement. 
Finally, the two non-ratifiers Australia and the United States commit to conservative targets 
that lie 32 percent and 17 percent above their respective (non-binding) Kyoto target, thereby 
facing comparable effective reduction requirements in 2020. The resulting commitments for 
2020 are summarized in Table 2 of Appendix 8.1. 
A further central input for our policy assessment is the allocation of emissions allowances for 
EU Member States and linking candidates which specifies an overall cap on emissions for 
those installations covered by the respective trading schemes. Here, we assume that the EU 
continues its predominant grandfathering method (i.e. a free allocation of allowances) to the 
covered installations in 2020. Numerically, emissions allocation can be described by so-called 
allocation factors, i.e. the fraction of baseline emissions that are freely allocated as 
allowances. In order to derive allocation factors for EU Member States in 2020 we rely on 
empirical allocation data for the second trading period of the EU ETS (2008 to 2012) – as 
published in the National Allocation Plan of each Member State – and on recent emissions 
projections for 2010 (EU, 2007c). Thereby, we conservatively assume that the relative 
allocation does not change between the second trading period and a future trading period in 
2020.2 Due to lacking information for Finland, Sweden, Bulgaria and Romania we assume a 
neutral allocation factor equal to one for these countries.  
Regarding the emissions allocation for the non-EU regions Japan and Canada in 2020, we 
start from a neutral allocation factor equal to one in 2010 which is then downscaled by 10 
percent, yielding an allocation factor of 0.90 in 2020. For Russia we assume an allocation 
factor equal to one in 2020, implying no allocation of excess permits to installations covered 
                                                 
2 We relax this assumption by presenting a sensitivity analysis of the allowance allocation in section 5.4. 
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by a Russian ETS.3 Finally, for the non-ratifiers United States and Australia, we downscale a 
neutral allocation factor of one in 2010 by 5 percent, resulting in an allocation factor of 0.95 
in 2020. Thus, all allocation factors for linking candidates in 2020 lay above the (non-
weighted) average allocation factor of the European Union (0.865), indicating a less strict 
emissions allocation to the covered sectors as compared to the European Union. Table 5 in 
Appendix 8.3 presents the resulting allocation factors for the EU and all linking candidates.  
 
CDM transaction costs and investment risk 
While the CDM serves as a flexible mechanism that enables industrialized countries to import 
low-cost emissions reductions in order to achieve their Kyoto targets, the potential economic 
benefits of the CDM may be substantially reduced by transaction costs associated with 
abatement projects in developing countries. Such transaction costs may arise from a variety of 
activities associated with market exchange, e.g. search and information acquisition, 
bargaining over prices, as well as negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts. In 
our quantitative model framework, constant transaction costs are represented by an absolute 
premium on the marginal abatement costs of CDM host countries, amounting to 1°US$/tCO2.4 
Transaction costs, thereby, increase marginal abatement costs of CDM host countries by 
inducing an upward shift of the CDM supply curve. 
As a second barrier to CDM investments we account for investment risk involved in financing 
carbon-abatement projects. Following Böhringer and Löschel (2002), host-country-specific 
investment risk for CDM projects, e.g. resulting from country and project risks, is derived by 
regional bond-yield spreads between long-term government bonds of the respective 
developing country and the United States (as a risk-free reference region). It is assumed that 
investors are risk-neutral and discount emissions reduction credits generated by CDM projects 
with the mean risk value of the respective host country. The underlying data is based on the 
International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2000). In our 
quantitative model framework, investment risk reduces the generated CDM credit volume, 
                                                 
3 Excess emissions permits (so-called “Hot Air”) are due to lower projected baseline emissions than the target 
level implied by Russia’s reduction commitment in 2020. We abstract from “Hot Air” here, as a grandfathered 
allowance allocation of “Hot Air” would imply an indirect subsidy for Russian installations (the allocated 
permits could be directly exported to other ETS regions). It is not unambiguous if such an ETS design may 
prevail or even be linked to an EU scheme. 
4 The magnitude of transaction costs is consistent with recent estimations (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). 
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thereby lowering the revenue of CDM projects and effectively inducing a leftward rotation of 
the CDM supply curve. 
 
4 Policy scenarios 
In order to assess the competitiveness impacts of linking the EU ETS to emerging schemes 
outside Europe, we introduce alternative policy scenarios for the year 2020. Across all 
scenarios, the regulation stringency is represented by the underlying regional emissions 
reduction targets and the respective allowance allocation as presented in the previous section. 
Within the European and emerging non-European emissions trading schemes, the covered 
(ETS) sectors are assumed to be allocated tradable allowances, while the remaining (NETS) 
industries have to be regulated via domestic abatement measures (here: unilateral carbon 
taxation) in order to meet the national emissions reduction targets in 2020.5 In our analysis, 
emissions trading at the installation level is, thus, approximated by sectoral trading activities. 
Moreover, all regions that have not (yet) set up an emissions trading scheme are assumed to 
comply with their emissions reduction target by cost-efficient domestic emissions regulation, 
imposing a uniform carbon tax on the entire economy. Table 1 presents the set of policy 
scenarios of our analysis, showing the corresponding constellations of linking the EU ETS 
internationally. As a reference case, scenario EU represents the current EU trading scheme, 
while all non-EU linking candidates fulfill their Kyoto commitment by domestic action. 
Scenario EU+ indicates the potential linkage of the current EU ETS to emerging schemes in 
two countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, namely Japan and Canada. Scenario EU++ 
assumes that the Kyoto-ratifier Russia is joining the system of  the EU-27, Canada and Japan. 
Finally, the most optimistic scenario EU+++ implies linking the EU ETS also to emerging 
trading schemes in the non-ratifying Annex B countries United States and Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Note that for the emissions trading schemes of all linking candidates we assume an identical sectoral coverage 
to the EU ETS, as well as the regulation of CO2 as the only greenhouse gas. 
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Table 1: Policy scenarios in 2020 and CDM host countries  
Regional scenario Regions participating in emissions trading CDM regions 
EU EU-27 
EU+ 
EU-27 
Japan 
Canada 
EU++ 
EU-27 
Japan 
Canada 
Russian Federation 
EU+++ 
EU-27 
Japan 
Canada 
Russian Federation 
United States 
Australia 
China 
India 
Rest of East South Asia 
Brazil 
Central + South America 
South Africa 
 
The amending directive linking the European ETS with the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based 
mechanisms enables European companies (here: the ETS sectors) to generate emissions 
reductions in developing countries by means of the CDM and using the respective credits as a 
substitute for EU allowances (EU, 2004). We cover this regulation by introducing CDM 
access for European ETS sectors (denoting this scenario as EU_CDM) and adopt it for all 
linking candidates. By concentrating on private CDM investments only, we abstract from 
government CDM activities as facilitated under the Kyoto Protocol.6 Table 1 shows that for 
all regional scenarios alike six central developing regions are assumed to host CDM projects, 
representing major suppliers on the CDM carbon market (World Bank, 2006). As described in 
the previous section, our CDM representation considers transaction costs and investment risk 
as central barriers to CDM investments. In our subsequent comparative-static analysis we 
measure the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy in 2020 relative to the benchmark 
situation – usually termed Business-as-Usual (BaU) – where no emissions regulation is 
imposed. 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a macroeconomic impact assessment of government CDM under the Kyoto Protocol see Anger et al. 
(2007). 
 14
5 Simulation results  
This section presents the simulation results of our model-based assessment of the 
macroeconomic and competitiveness impacts of linking the EU ETS internationally. The 
corresponding quantitative simulation results are presented in Table 6 and Table 7 of 
Appendix 8.5. We start our analysis by reporting the effects of linking the EU ETS on the 
market for emissions permits (section 5.1) and the associated macroeconomic impacts 
(section 5.2), before addressing the competitiveness effects of linking the European trading 
scheme (section 5.3). Finally, we present a sensitivity analysis with respect to the assumed 
allowance allocation (section 5.4). 
5.1 Impacts on the emissions market 
Regarding the effects of linking the EU ETS on the market for emissions permits, Figure 4 
first shows that the international permit price resulting from a European emissions trading 
scheme in 2020 (scenario EU) amounts to 26.36 € per ton CO2 assuming an empirical 
allowance allocation (see section 3.2). The figure further illustrates that linking the EU system 
to emerging schemes substantially decreases the CO2 value in the covered sectors: Despite of 
the relatively high-cost abatement options of Canada and Japan, the relatively generous 
allowance allocation in both countries – i.e. an allocation factor equal to 0.90 – induces a 
lower permit price in the linked scheme (yielding scenario EU+), amounting to 21.17 €. 
A further integration of Russia (scenario EU++) increases the where-flexibility of emissions 
abatement and puts more downward pressure on the allowance price, amounting to 14.27 €. 
Note that we assume an allocation factor equal to one for Russia, so that we abstract from the 
assignation of potential excess emissions permits to the covered Russian installations in our 
scenario setting. Hence, the lower permit price in scenario EU++ originates from relatively 
low-cost abatement options of permit-exporting Russian ETS sectors. Further linking of the 
EU ETS to the non-ratifiers Australia and the United States (scenario EU+++) induces an 
additional permit price fall to 8.24 € per ton CO2. Despite of the generally high-cost 
abatement options in Australia and the Unites States, the generously assignation of emissions 
(allocation factor equal to 0.95) implies that these regions exhibit relatively low marginal 
abatement cost levels as compared to the other participants. The corresponding permit supply 
from these countries further decreases the international permit price.  
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Figure 4: CO2 permit price within linked schemes by scenario 
 
Across all linking scenarios, allowing the covered ETS sectors to import low-cost emissions 
reductions from developing countries via the CDM substantially lowers the international CO2 
value. The maximum price in this case amounts to 4.32 € in a purely European system, while 
the most integrated scheme including Australia and the United States generates the lowest 
value of 3.87€. According to Figure 4, establishing CDM access for ETS sectors levels out the 
permit price differences between alternative linking strategies. 
5.2 Macroeconomic impacts 
From a general equilibrium perspective, the economic effects of climate change policies 
surpass the emissions market. First, carbon abatement policies may decrease domestic 
production levels by the associated decreased energy use due to increased domestic abatement 
or a policy-induced increased permit price. Second, in large open economies policy-induced 
carbon restrictions induce changes in exports and imports, most dominantly on fossil fuel 
markets, thereby affecting international prices and the regional terms of trade (Böhringer and 
Rutherford, 2002). In order to analyze these general equilibrium (i.e. multi-market) impacts 
from climate policy in greater detail, in the following we assess aggregate macroeconomic 
indicators such as production and social welfare.7 
                                                 
7 Note that we pursue a cost-effectiveness analysis that quantifies adjustment costs of environmental regulation 
as compared to an unconstrained business-as-usual situation. The deliberate neglect of economic benefits from 
controlling global warming implies that the macroeconomic effects resulting from the imposition of emissions 
constraints on the respective economies will necessarily be negative. Welfare changes are expressed by the 
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Table 6 of Appendix 8.5 shows that for the EU-27, production and welfare impacts of 
emissions regulation in a purely European trading scheme amount to roughly three percent. 
While these macroeconomic impacts do not change significantly by linking the EU ETS to 
Canada, Japan and Russia, the maximum where-flexibility of emissions abatement in scenario 
EU+++ slightly reduces production and welfare losses. Moreover, it shows that accounting for 
CDM access does not change the welfare impacts across scenarios substantially: Especially in 
the linked scheme EU+++ the access to low-cost emissions abatement via the CDM for only a 
part of European economies (i.e. the covered sectors) cannot induce substantial efficiency 
improvements, as the participating regions already benefit from a high where-flexibility by 
linking their schemes. 
For those non-EU regions which are not (yet) involved in linked emissions trading schemes 
we assume compliance with the national emissions reduction targets (see Table 2 of Appendix 
8.1) by means of unilateral economy-wide carbon taxation.  Thereby, we are able to measure 
the economic implications for these countries of linking to the European system against the 
consistent reference scenario of cost-efficient domestic action. For our policy scenarios, Table 
6 shows heterogeneous macroeconomic impacts across non-EU countries. These differences 
originate from diverging national emissions reduction targets, permit allocation stringencies 
and emissions abatement options. Moreover, all regions with effective emissions reduction 
requirements (except of the United States) face substantially higher welfare costs when 
linking to the EU scheme as compared to domestic action: On pure efficiency grounds, the 
assumed design of emissions trading schemes is inferior to the reference case of cost-efficient 
domestic action. The central reason is that a generous allowance allocation to the covered ETS 
sectors implies the imposition of high emissions reduction efforts of the non-covered sectors. 
In the absence of the CDM, these industries – having relatively high-cost abatement options 
(e.g. in the household or transport sector) – have to be regulated by costly complementary 
domestic carbon taxation in order to achieve the national emissions reduction targets.  
As for the European economies, the welfare impacts for most non-EU regions do not vary 
significantly across linking and CDM scenarios. However, Table 6 shows that permit-
exporting Russia substantially benefits from linking to the joint scheme of the EU-27, Canada 
and Japan. These benefits are cancelled out again if also Australia and the United States join 
the international trading scheme, introducing a permit-price decreasing where-flexibility. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hicksian Equivalent Variation (HEV). The welfare indicator thereby summarizes both economic impacts on the 
emissions market as well as macroeconomic impacts. 
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same reasoning may be applied if CDM access for the covered ETS sectors facilitates the 
inflow of competing low-cost permits from developing countries into the trading system. 
5.3 Effects on international competitiveness 
In this section, we assess the national and sectoral competitiveness effects of linking EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme with emerging schemes outside Europe. The corresponding 
numerical simulation results are presented in Table 7 of Appendix 8.5. 
 
Competitiveness effects for the EU 
Focusing first on EU Member States, Figure 5 (a) reports economy-wide competitiveness 
effects as measured by changes in the terms of trade (ToT) – i.e. the ratio between export and 
import prices – across alternative policy scenarios. The figure illustrates that – consistent with 
our findings on welfare impacts – linking the EU ETS internationally does not substantially 
affect the national competitiveness for EU Member States. However, the ToT losses of EU 
economies in a purely domestic European scheme (scenario EU) are slightly increased from -
3.1 to -3.3 percent by integrating Canada, Japan and Russia (yielding scenario EU++), while 
economy-wide competitiveness can be improved to -2.9 percent by opening the European 
trading system to all linking candidates (yielding scenario EU+++). Again these findings do 
not significantly change by the introduction of CDM access for the covered industries. 
In order to decompose the national competitiveness impacts for EU Member States, we assess 
sectoral competitiveness effects using two well-known indicators: Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) and Relative World Trade Shares (RWS).8 Note that the two indicators 
may be used complementarily in assessing the sectoral ability to compete, as they measure 
competitiveness implications using different reference points: The RCA indicator compares 
the trade performance of an ETS (NETS) sector with the performance of all sectors within the 
respective region. The RWS indicator relates the trade performance of an ETS (NETS) sector 
in a region to the performance of ETS (NETS) sectors across the world.  
                                                 
8 A detailed description of the employed competitiveness indicators is given in Appendix 8.4. 
 18
Terms of Trade impacts for primary linking candidates (in % vs. BAU)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_
CDM
EU+_
CDM
EU++_
CDM
EU+++_
CDM
EU-27
Japan
Canada
   
Terms of Trade impacts for secondary linking candidates (in % vs. BAU)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_
CDM
EU+_
CDM
EU++_
CDM
EU+++_
CDM
Russia
Australia
United States
 
 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) for EU industries (in % vs BAU)
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_
CDM
EU+_
CDM
EU++_
CDM
EU+++_
CDM
ETS
NETS
        
Relative World Trade Shares (RWS) for EU industries (in % vs BAU)
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_
CDM
EU+_
CDM
EU++_
CDM
EU+++_
CDM
ETS
NETS
 
 
Figure 5: Economy-wide and sectoral competitiveness indicators by region, sector and scenario 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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While the economy-wide impacts across policy scenarios are limited, the sectoral 
competitiveness implications show a differentiated picture. Firstly, Figure 5 (c) and (d) 
illustrate that in a purely European trading scheme (scenario EU), the covered European ETS 
sectors exhibit large competitiveness gains vis-à-vis the remaining EU industries – the 
corresponding RCA indicator amounting to as much as 10.32 percent. This result is due to a 
relatively generous allowance allocation to these sectors and the corresponding high 
complementary domestic carbon taxation on NETS industries which have costly abatement 
options. Thus, the NETS industries account for the major economic compliance burden and 
face competitiveness losses vis-à-vis the ETS sectors. Moreover, in a purely EU trading 
scheme the European ETS sectors exhibit competitiveness gains vis-à-vis comparable sectors 
in non-EU regions, however at a lower level (the corresponding RWS indicator amounting to 
only 4.13 percent). This competitiveness improvement of the European ETS sectors is due to 
the fact that comparable sectors in non-EU regions are burdened by domestic emissions 
regulation in this policy setting.  
Secondly, Figure 5 (c) and (d) suggest that the RWS varies similarly to the RCA indicator for 
linking scenarios of the EU ETS, only at a lower level: By linking to emerging schemes in 
Japan and Canada, the sectors covered by the European trading scheme may face slight 
decreases in their competitiveness both vis-à-vis NETS industries within the EU (RCA) and 
comparable ETS sectors in non-EU regions (RWS). Here, the RWS loss of European ETS 
sectors reflects the competitiveness improvement of the same sectors in Canada and Japan: 
The introduction of an emissions trading scheme with a generous allowance allocation implies 
a preferential treatment of their ETS sectors as compared to cost-efficient domestic action. 
Furthermore, the RCA loss of European ETS sectors vis-à-vis the European NETS sectors is 
due to general equilibrium effects on international trade: The introduction of inefficient 
emissions trading schemes in Canada and Japan implies an excessive burden shifting from 
ETS to NETS sectors in these countries. As a consequence, the (competing) European NETS 
sectors increase their international export activity and thus improve their competitiveness also 
vis-à-vis the European ETS sectors. While the European ETS industries face competitiveness 
losses through linking to Japan and Canada, we generally observe opposite (and less 
pronounced) effects for the non-covered European NETS sectors.  
Further regional flexibility in emissions trading through a linkage to low-cost permit supplier 
Russia may, however, substantially counteract the competitiveness losses of European ETS 
sectors as compared to regional scenario EU+. In particular, we observe competitiveness gains 
for the European ETS sectors as compared to regional scenarios EU and EU+. Further 
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integrating Australia and the United States (scenario EU+++) implies a slight decrease in 
competitiveness for European ETS sectors vis-à-vis comparable industries in non-EU regions 
(RWS). These results can be explained analogously to our above findings for linking to Japan 
and Canada.  
Figure 5 (c) and (d) illustrate that for each linking strategy, CDM access for ETS sectors 
serves as a flexibility instrument that improves the sectoral competitiveness effects for these 
industries both vis-à-vis the remaining sectors of EU economies and comparable sectors in 
non-EU regions. On the contrary, it shows that the non-covered NETS sectors are not able to 
improve their international competitiveness as they are excluded from the low-cost abatement 
options of the CDM.  
 
Competitiveness effects for linking candidates 
Figure 5 (a) and (b) summarize the prospects for the non-EU linking candidates of joining the 
European trading system in terms of national competitiveness impacts.9 While linking the EU 
ETS to Japan and Canada (yielding scenario EU+) induces a further increase of the initial 
economy-wide competitiveness for Canada in scenario EU, Japan is facing a further decrease 
in its ToT. These heterogeneous results can be explained as follows: A linkage to Japan and 
Canada implies the introduction of an inefficient domestic emissions regulation in both 
countries. As mentioned above, these inefficiencies are due to the relatively generous 
allowance allocation and the associated abatement-burden shifting to the non-covered NETS 
sectors of these regions. Such a policy design implies competitiveness gains for ETS sectors 
and competitiveness losses for NETS sectors in both countries. However, the induced burden-
shifting from covered to non-covered sectors is more pronounced in Japan than in Canada. As 
a consequence, in Japan overall export (import) values are decreasing (increasing) and the 
ToT further deteriorate through linking to the European ETS. In contrast, Canada is able to 
increase (decrease) its overall export (import) values and can thus benefit from linking to the 
EU in terms of overall competitiveness. Here, the reason is a strong competitiveness 
improvement in the energy-intensive sectors covered by the Canadian trading system. These 
industries are benefiting to a large extent from linking to the low-priced European system, as 
they faced a relatively high domestic carbon tax before linking to the EU. 
                                                 
9 Note that all numerical sectoral competitiveness impacts for non-EU regions can be found in Table 7 of 
Appendix 8.5. 
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A further linkage to permit-exporting Russia (yielding scenario EU++) slightly improves the 
ToT situation of the permit importers Canada and Japan, but substantially decreases the 
competitiveness gains of Russia itself. Here, the newly linked Russia has an incentive to 
reduce emissions at relatively low marginal cost in order to export permits to the emissions-
trading partners. These adjustments in the Russian economy induce negative feed-back effects 
in terms of a decreased international fossil-fuel demand and price, subsequently deteriorating 
the ToT of energy-exporting Russia. Finally, a further integration of Australia and the United 
States (yielding scenario EU+++) decreases the national-wide competitiveness of both linking 
candidates due to the introduction of an inefficient domestic emissions regulation also in these 
countries. However, the Russian ToT are increasing again in this policy scenario. In general, 
allowing for CDM imports to the covered ETS sectors leaves these qualitative findings 
unchanged. 
Summarizing our findings from an incentive perspective, in the absence of the CDM both the 
European Union and Canada improve their economy-wide competitiveness by linking their 
emissions trading schemes to all linking candidates (yielding scenario EU+++). On the other 
hand, both Russia and United States benefit most from a joint trading scheme between the 
EU-27, Canada and Japan (scenario EU+). For their part, Japan and Australia loose 
competitiveness – compared to cost-efficient domestic action – by establishing and linking 
their emissions trading systems internationally. However, from the set of alternative trading 
schemes, Australia prefers a joint system between the EU-27, Japan, Canada and Russia 
(scenario EU++), while Japan would opt for linking up to all candidates. In summary, we 
observe a large regional heterogeneity regarding the incentives for establishing alternative 
supra-European emissions trading schemes. 
5.4  Sensitivity analysis: Proportional allowance allocation 
While the allocation of emissions permits to the covered sectors in future trading schemes is 
crucial for our simulation results, it clearly underlies a considerable uncertainty. In the 
following we therefore present a sensitivity analysis with respect to the stringency of 
allowance allocation. In contrast to the empirically motivated allocation factors (see sections 
3.2 and 5.3) we now assume that the covered sectors of a domestic trading system have to 
reduce their emissions proportionally to the national effective emissions reduction target. In 
contrast to the preferential treatment of ETS sectors under the original allowance allocation, in 
this case the covered industries equitably contribute to the national abatement efforts. For 
example, a region with an effective emissions reduction target of 40 percent versus BaU in 
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2020 would allocate an amount of emissions allowances to the covered sectors which 
corresponds to an allocation factor of 0.6. This rule implies a stricter allocation to the covered 
sectors as compared to the empirically based allocation factors.  
The simulation results of our sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 8 and Table 9 of 
Appendix 8.5. It shows that the stricter allowance allocation induces a higher permit price 
within the EU ETS, amounting to 31.73 € per ton of CO2. In contrast to our previous findings, 
the proportional permit allocation induces a slightly increased permit price (to 33.68 €) by 
linking the European scheme to Canada and Japan. This price increase is, however, 
substantially counteracted by linking to the permit exporter Russia, which decreases the CO2 
value to 20.54 €, and further to 15.27 € by integrating Australia and the United States.  
We find that the overall level of welfare losses due to emissions regulation and the associated 
economy-wide competitiveness effects are far less pronounced in the case of a stricter 
allowance allocation, improving efficiency within the trading schemes for all linking 
scenarios. In particular, the former negative welfare impacts for non-EU linking candidates 
from establishing an inefficient domestic trading scheme are substantially diminished, thereby 
increasing the attractiveness of the linking process for these countries. While our economy-
wide competitiveness results do not differ significantly from our findings in the previous 
section, we conclude that the competitiveness impacts for the European ETS sectors of 
linking the EU system are amplified in the case of proportional allowance allocation: While 
linking to Canada and Japan is even more disadvantageous, the partly positive previous 
competitiveness effects of integrating Russia, Australia and the United States are improved 
substantially both vis-à-vis the remaining EU sectors and comparable industries in non-EU 
regions. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Given the coexistent EU priorities concerning the competitiveness of European industries and 
ambitious international emissions regulation at the company level, this paper presents an 
efficiency and international trade analysis of developing supra-European emissions trading 
schemes. In order to achieve its climate policy objectives more cost-efficiently, the EU 
currently proposes to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) by linking to 
emerging domestic trading systems outside Europe, e.g. in Canada, Japan and Australia. The 
EU ETS may thus form the nucleus for a gradually expanding global carbon market that 
enables international emissions trading at the company level. 
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Employing both economic theory and numerical model simulations, we first discuss the 
efficiency aspects of integrating emissions trading schemes within a partial analytical 
framework. Our stylized analysis suggests that – independently of the marginal abatement 
costs of a region to be linked with an existing scheme – the integration of trading systems 
yields economic efficiency gains for all participating regions. This result is due to the 
increased where-flexibility of regional emissions abatement. We subsequently analyze the 
macroeconomic and trade-based competitiveness impacts of linking the EU ETS employing a 
large-scale computable general equilibrium model of the global economy. 
Based on empirical allowance allocation of the EU ETS, we find that while linking the EU 
system internationally may substantially decrease the international permit price, the associated 
aggregate welfare impacts for the EU are rather limited. As the efficiency gains from an 
international linkage exclusively apply to those sectors which are covered by the linked 
trading schemes, the remaining sectors will not benefit from an increased where-flexibility. 
For non-EU countries, establishing an inefficient trading system may induce substantial 
welfare losses – due to a too generous allowance allocation to the covered sectors – which 
may be compensated only partially through linking to the EU trading scheme. Accounting for 
permit imports from outside the linked schemes via the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) does not alter these welfare impacts substantially: The access to low-cost emissions 
abatement in developing countries for only a part of the economy (i.e. the covered sectors) 
cannot induce substantial aggregate efficiency improvements – especially in the case of 
linking all candidates, as the participating regions already benefit from a high where-
flexibility. 
We find that – consistent with the insights from our welfare analysis – linking the EU ETS 
internationally does not substantially affect economy-wide EU competitiveness as measured 
by the terms of trade. However, the trade-based competitiveness effects crucially depend on 
the linked trading system: Although EU economy-wide competitiveness varies only 
moderately across linking scenarios, the sectoral decomposition of these aggregate effects 
shows that European industries are much more sensitive to the linking constellation. By 
integrating emerging schemes in Japan and Canada, those sectors covered by the European 
trading scheme may face competitiveness losses both vis-à-vis the non-covered industries 
within the EU and comparable sectors in non-EU regions. These effects are due to the 
introduction of inefficient emissions trading schemes in Canada and Japan. Further regional 
flexibility in emissions trading through a linkage to low-cost permit supplier Russia may, 
however, substantially counteract the negative sectoral competitiveness impacts on the 
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covered European industries. Finally, a future integration of Australia and the United States 
into a joint trading system of all linking candidates keeps the competitiveness losses for 
European ETS sectors at a moderate level.  
Regarding the international trade impacts for non-EU countries, we find that the linking 
candidates have very heterogeneous incentives to join the European trading system, which 
range from pronounced competitiveness improvements for Canada to substantial 
competitiveness losses for Japan. Our sensitivity analysis assuming a stricter allowance 
allocation within regional trading systems suggests, however, that a more efficient design of 
domestic ETS can boost the overall prospects for establishing supra-European emissions 
trading schemes. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Benchmark data sources 
The main data source underlying our model assessment is the GTAP version 6 database that 
represents global production and trade data for 87 regions and 57 sectors in the baseyear 2001 
(Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006). For this application, the data set has been aggregated to 
36 regions and 10 sectors in order to reduce the dimensionality of the computational problem, 
but at the same time keep sufficient detail for the carbon-relevant regions and sectors (see 
Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix 8.2). Reconciliation of these data sources yields the 
benchmark data of our model.  
In a second step, we perform a forward calibration of the 2001 economies to the target year 
2020. For this purpose we employ baseline estimates for GDP growth, energy demand and 
future energy prices as well as carbon emissions, relying on energy trends for EU Member 
States (EU, 2003) and on international energy projections for non-European economies (US 
Department of Energy, 2005). The magnitude and distribution of costs associated with the 
implementation of future emissions constraints depend on the baseline projections for GDP, 
fuel prices, energy efficiency improvements etc. In our comparative-static framework, we 
measure the costs of abatement relative to a baseline, i.e. relative to the benchmark situation – 
usually termed Business-as-Usual (BaU), where no emissions regulation is imposed. As an 
overview on the emissions data underlying our analysis, Table 2 shows baseline emissions 
and reduction requirements of Annex-B countries in 2010 and 2020. For the year 2010 we 
present the targets under the Kyoto Protocol, while for 2020 we assume the future 
commitments as laid out in section 3.2. Contrasting regional baseline carbon emissions in the 
respective year to the regional emissions reduction target vs. 1990 emissions yields the 
effective emissions reduction requirement of a region. 
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Table 2: Baseline emissions and reduction requirements of ratifying Annex-B countries  
Year 1990 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Austria                          55.1 60.7 66.7 13.0 24.3 21.0 37.5
Belgium 106.3 112.2 120.1 7.5 19.5 12.4 28.8
Denmark                       52.8 46.6 45.0  21.0 31.3 10.5 19.4
Finland                          53.2 51.4 55.7 0.0 13.0 -3.5 16.9
France                           354.1 406.4 447.9 0.0 13.0 12.9 31.2
Germany                       943.0 823.6 869.8 21.0 31.3 9.5 25.5
United Kingdom           569.1 519.4 559.0 12.5 23.9 4.1 22.5
Greece                           71.1 105.6 112.2 -25.0 -8.8 15.8 31.1
Ireland                           29.7 46.5 48.7 -13.0 1.7 27.8 40.0
Italy                               390.8 422.2 437.4 6.5 18.7 13.5 27.3
Netherlands                   152.9 174.0 184.4 6.0 18.2 17.4 32.2
Portugal                         39.0 67.9 80.4 -27.0 -10.5 27.1 46.4
Spain                             203.8 302.6 335.7 -15.0 0.0 22.5 39.3
Sweden                          50.6 54.0 68.3 -4.0 9.5 2.5 33.0
Luxemburg 10.6 11.6 12.6 28.0 37.4 34.2 47.3
Hungary                        68.5 62.2 68.9 6.0 18.2 -3.5 18.7
Poland                           340.1 286.2 325.1 6.0 18.2 -11.7 14.4
Cyprus 4.5 8.1 8.9 8.0 20.0 48.9 59.5
Czech Republic 158.8 103.1 100.5 8.0 20.0 -41.7 -26.5
Malta 2.5 3.3 4.2 8.0 20.0 30.3 52.4
Slovakia 51.4 41.6 46.2 8.0 20.0 -13.7 11.0
Slovenia 10.9 14.0 15.4 8.0 20.0 28.4 43.3
Estonia 36.6 14.2 11.8 8.0 20.0 -137.1 -148.3
Latvia 16.9 8.3 9.9 8.0 20.0 -87.3 -36.6
Lithuania 32.2 17.2 22.0 8.0 20.0 -72.2 -17.1
Bulgaria 73.6 42.9 43.0 8.0 20.0 -57.8 -37.0
Romania 168.6 90.3 100.6 8.0 20.0 -71.8 -34.1
Canada 473.0 681.0 757.0 6.0 11.0 34.7 44.4
Japan 990.0 1211.0 1240.0 6.0 11.0 23.2 28.9
Russia 2347.0 1732.0 1971.0 0.0 5.0 -35.5 -13.1
Australia 294.0 520.0 582.0 -8.0 -40.0 38.9 29.3
United States 4989.0 6561.0 7461.0 7.0 -10.0 29.3 26.4
Emissions reduction
target (% vs. 1990)
Baseline CO2 Emissions 
(Mt of CO2)
Effective reduction
requirement (% vs. baseline)
 
Sources: EU (2003): European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030; US Department of Energy 
(2005): International Energy Outlook; own calculations 
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8.2 Model regions and sectors 
 
Table 3: PACE model regions 
EU-15 EU-12 Non-EU regions 
Austria                               Hungary                               Japan       
Belgium Poland                                Canada                                
Germany                               Czech Republic Russian Federation 
Denmark                               Slovakia Rest of Former Soviet Union 
Finland                               Bulgaria Australia 
France                                Romania New Zealand 
United Kingdom                       United States 
Greece                                
Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania) China including Hong Kong 
Ireland                               India  
Italy                                 
Rest of EU (Slovenia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus) Rest of East South Asia            
Netherlands                           Brazil 
Portugal                              Central and South America 
Spain                                 South Africa 
Sweden                                
 
Rest of World 
 
 
Table 4: PACE model sectors 
ETS sectors NETS sectors Other sectors 
Refined oil products Coal 
Electricity Crude oil 
Iron and steel industry Natural gas 
Paper products and 
publishing 
Non-ferrous metals 
Mineral products 
Rest of Industry (Other 
manufactures and services) 
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8.3 Regional allowance allocation 
 
Table 5: Allocation factor by region in 2020 
Region Allocation factor 
Austria 0.813 
Belgium 0.943 
Germany 0.876 
Denmark 0.752 
Spain 0.693 
France 0.907 
Finland 1.000 
Greece 0.807 
Ireland 0.750 
Italy 0.849 
Netherlands 0.893 
Portugal 0.839 
Sweden 1.000 
United Kingdom 0.900 
Czech Republic 0.825 
Estonia 0.644 
Hungary 0.887 
Lithuania 0.953 
Latvia 0.736 
Luxembourg 0.839 
Poland 0.833 
Slovenia 0.777 
Slovakia 0.929 
Cyprus 0.881 
Malta 0.997 
Bulgaria 1.000 
Romania 1.000 
Japan 0.900 
Canada 0.900 
Russian Federation 1.000 
United States 0.950 
Australia 0.950 
Source: EU (2007b), own calculations   
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8.4 Competitiveness indicators 
We implement the following indicators into the PACE model in order to account for sectoral 
and economy-wide competitiveness effects: 
? Terms of Trade (ToT): 
i
i
X
i
M
P
ToT
P
=  
where 
iX
P denotes the price of exports and 
iM
P  denotes the price of imports, for a particular 
region i the ToT index expresses the price of its exports in terms of its imports. The Terms of 
Trade improve (deteriorate) as the index increases (decreases). 
? Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) 
For a particular region and sector, this index compares the ratio of exports by a specific sector 
over its imports with the ratio of exports over imports across all sectors of the region. Letting 
X denote exports, M imports, i the region and j the sector, the index for revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) for region i in sector j can be presented as follows: 
∑∑=
j
ij
j
ij
ijij
ij MX
MX
RCA
/
/
 
If the sectoral export-import ratio is identical to the economy-wide ratio, the RCA index takes 
the neutral value of one ( 1=ijRCA ). Thus, a region i is said to have a revealed comparative 
advantage in sector j if the RCA index exceeds unity ( ∞≤< RCA1 ). By contrast, a region i 
has a revealed comparative disadvantage in sector j if the RCA index takes the values between 
zero and one ( 10 <≤ RCA ). 
? Relative World Trade Shares (RWS) 
This index compares the ratio of country’s exports in a certain sector over the world’s exports 
in this sector with the ratio of country’s overall exports over the world’s exports in all sectors: 
/
/
ij ij
i
ij
ij ij
j i j
X X
RWS
X X
=
∑
∑ ∑∑ . 
The RWS indicator lies in the same value range as the RCA indicator ( ∞≤≤ ijRWS0 ) and 
may thus be interpreted analogously. 
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8.5 Numerical simulation results 
Table 6: Core allowance allocation – Environmental and macroeconomic indicators in 2020  
Scenario
 
Region 
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_CDM EU+_CDM EU++_CDM EU+++_CDM 
 Carbon emissions reduction (in % vs. BaU) 
EU-27 -27.30 -25.70 -23.00 -20.50 -16.70 -17.00 -16.80 -17.50 
Canada -36.40 -38.70 -36.50 -34.90 -36.40 -33.30 -33.20 -33.50 
Japan -23.60 -28.70 -26.70 -24.60 -23.60 -21.90 -21.80 -22.40 
Russia 2.80 2.50 -8.10 -5.30 2.50 2.30 -2.00 -2.60 
Australia -21.90 -21.90 -21.90 -22.70 -21.90 -21.90 -21.90 -17.40 
United States -14.10 -14.10 -14.10 -16.80 -14.10 -14.10 -14.10 -13.90 
 CO2 value in ETS sectors (in $US per ton of CO2) 
EU-27 26.36 21.17 14.27 8.24 4.32 4.27 4.23 3.87 
Canada 104.31 21.17 14.27 8.24 103.90 4.27 4.23 3.87 
Japan 94.90 21.17 14.27 8.24 94.96 4.27 4.23 3.87 
Russia 0.00 0.00 14.27 8.24 0.00 0.00 4.23 3.87 
Australia 23.40 22.94 23.03 8.24 23.24 22.66 22.77 3.87 
United States 20.10 19.77 19.79 8.24 19.90 19.55 19.62 3.87 
 Production impact (in % vs. BaU) 
EU-27 -3.46 -3.5 -3.49 -3.36 -3.48 -3.45 -3.46 -3.44 
Canada -0.48 -2.49 -2.52 -2.47 -0.45 -2.56 -2.57 -2.46 
Japan -0.35 -1.25 -1.24 -1.22 -0.34 -1.22 -1.22 -1.21 
Russia 1.04 1.10 0.75 1.04 1.09 1.14 1.02 1.16 
Australia 0.38 0.41 0.41 -2.76 0.37 0.41 0.41 -2.8 
United States -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.28 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.26 
         
 Welfare impact (in %  of HEV) 
EU-27 -2.98 -2.98 -2.98 -2.96 -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 
Canada -0.91 -2.14 -2.16 -2.18 -0.92 -2.17 -2.17 -2.20 
Japan -0.03 -0.51 -0.52 -0.52 -0.03 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 
Russia -1.82 -1.93 -1.53 -1.98 -1.83 -1.94 -1.87 -2.12 
Australia -0.46 -0.45 -0.45 -3.08 -0.45 -0.43 -0.44 -3.07 
United States 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05 
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Table 7: Core allowance allocation – Economy-wide and sectoral competitiveness indicators in 2020 
Scenario
Region 
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_CDM EU+_CDM EU++_CDM EU+++_CDM 
 Terms of Trade impact (in % vs. BaU) 
EU-27 -3.10 -3.30 -3.30 -2.90 -3.20 -3.20 -3.20 -3.20 
Canada 0.90 2.10 2.30 2.40 0.90 2.40 2.40 2.50 
Japan -2.30 -4.50 -4.30 -4.20 -2.30 -4.10 -4.10 -4.10 
Russia 11.00 11.20 5.60 9.30 10.80 11.0 9.50 10.90 
Australia 2.40 2.20 2.30 1.90 2.20 1.90 2.10 2.10 
United States -0.90 -0.30 -0.30 -2.30 -0.20 -0.40 -0.30 -1.40   
 Revealed Comparative Advantage – RCA (in % vs. BaU) 
 ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS 
EU-27 10.32 -1.16 9.99 -1.12 11.33 -1.26 10.70   -1.19 13.66 -1.50 12.19 -1.35 12.39 -1.37 11.38 -1.26 
Canada -22.02 3.63 9.92 -1.15 12.93 -1.55 12.27 -1.41 -22.68 3.75 16.11 -1.94 16.31 -1.97 12.83 -1.46 
Japan -11.73 1.02 9.10   -0.56 11.09 -0.70 9.81 -0.61 -12.04 1.05 12.19 -0.77 12.55 -0.80 10.14 -0.63 
Russia -4.58 1.82 -6.72 2.84 -23.1 9.88 -18.49 7.81 -6.37 2.45 -8.31 3.46 -13.49 5.59 -14.26 5.98 
Australia -23.88 5.51 -25.75 5.99 -25.54 5.93 9.13 -0.47 -24.26 5.61 -26.26 6.13 -26.1 6.08 15.47 -1.64 
United States -4.98 0.39 -11.04 0.93 -11.33 0.96 -7.13 0.53 -5.88 0.47 -12.44 1.06 -12.33 1.05 -6.54 0.47 
 Relative World Trade Shares – RWS (in % vs. BaU) 
 ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS 
EU-27 4.13 -0.34 3.19 -0.32 4.04 -0.41 3.25 -0.38 5.08 -0.51 3.49 -0.42 3.72 -0.44 3.08 -0.41 
Canada 28.68 2.20 52.54 -0.78 55.34 -1.10 53.99 -0.99 27.71 2.25 56.72 -1.37 57.06 -1.40 53.59 -1.01 
Japan 37.21 0.43 45.43 -0.13 47.06 -0.22 46.00 -0.23 36.56 0.43 46.94 -0.27 47.31 -0.29 45.74 -0.25 
Russia 45.95 1.26 43.43 2.12 31.23 7.76 34.92 6.07 44.51 1.72 41.87 2.60 38.18 4.33 37.68 4.60 
Australia 23.46 4.24 20.69 4.60 21.30 4.52 45.45 0.24 22.70 4.30 19.61 4.70 19.96 4.66 50.82 -0.80 
United States 43.51 0.01 38.15 0.20 38.12 0.20 38.39 0.12 42.42 0.02 36.62 0.23 36.80 0.23 38.11 0.10 
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Table 8: Proportional allowance allocation – Environmental and macroeconomic indicators in 2020  
Scenario
 
Region 
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_CDM EU+_CDM EU++_CDM EU+++_CDM 
 Carbon emissions reduction (in % vs. BaU) 
EU-27 -26.50 -26.90 -23.60 -21.90 -15.60 -16.00 -15.90 -16.60 
Canada -36.40 -33.00 -29.90 -28.50 -36.40 -24.30 -24.30 -24.70 
Japan -23.60 -23.80 -21.00 -19.50 -23.60 -14.20 -14.10 -14.90 
Russia 3.00 2.90 -10.20 -8.30 2.70 2.50 -2.00 -2.80 
Australia -21.90 -21.90 -21.90 -22.00 -21.90 -21.90 -21.90 -12.40 
United States -14.10 -14.10 -14.10 -16.00 -14.10 -14.10 -14.10 -10.30 
 CO2 value in ETS sectors (in $US per ton of CO2) 
EU-27 31.73 33.68 20.54 15.27 4.45 4.66 4.61 4.85 
Canada 105.03 33.68 20.54 15.27 104.55 4.66 4.61 4.85 
Japan 93.46 33.68 20.54 15.27 93.38 4.66 4.61 4.85 
Russia 0 0 20.54 15.27 0 0 4.61 4.85 
Australia 23.70 23.48 23.57 15.27 23.51 23.04 23.14 4.85 
United States 19.85 19.72 19.72 15.27 19.72 19.37 19.44 4.85 
 Production impact (in % vs. BaU) 
EU-27 -1.73 -1.72 -1.70 -1.67 -1.66 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65 
Canada -1.73 -1.72 -1.70 -1.67 -1.66 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65 
Japan -0.58 -1.14 -1.20 -1.19 -0.55 -1.25 -1.25 -1.17 
Russia -0.37 -0.62 -0.59 -0.58 -0.37 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55 
Australia 0.82 0.84 0.38 0.56 0.86 0.88 0.76 0.81 
United States 0.30 0.32 0.32 -0.15 0.30 0.32 0.32 -0.26 
 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.18 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.14 
 Welfare impact (in %  of HEV) 
EU-27 -0.85 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 
Canada -0.89 -1.02 -1.00 -0.99 -0.89 -0.92 -0.92 -0.94 
Japan -0.04 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
Russia -1.45 -1.51 -0.84 -1.17 -1.45 -1.50 -1.43 -1.54 
Australia -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.58 -0.44 -0.42 -0.43 -0.51 
United States -0.01 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 9: Proportional allowance allocation – Economy-wide and sectoral competitiveness indicators in 2020 
Scenario
Region 
EU EU+ EU++ EU+++ EU_CDM EU+_CDM EU++_CDM EU+++_CDM 
 Terms of Trade impact (in % vs. BaU) 
EU-27 -2.80 -2.80 -2.60 -2.60 -2.50 -2.60 -2.60 -2.60 
Canada 0.80 1.50 1.70 1.80 0.80 1.70 1.70 1.80 
Japan -2.30 -3.10 -2.90 -2.90 -2.30 -2.70 -2.70 -2.70 
Russia 10.10 10.30 2.20 4.80 9.70 9.60 8.00 8.40 
Australia 2.20 2.20 2.30 1.80 2.10 1.80 1.90 1.90 
United States -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -1.00 -0.30 -0.40 -0.40 -0.60 
 Revealed Comparative Advantage – RCA (in % vs. BaU) 
 ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS 
EU-27 3.72 -0.43 2.86 -0.33 4.96 -0.57 5.10 -0.58 7.33 -0.83 6.28 -0.71 6.49 -0.73 5.89 -0.67 
Canada -19.53 3.17 -1.95 0.35 2.66 -0.33 3.38 -0.41 -20.26 3.30 7.67 -1.00 7.87 -1.03 5.21 -0.63 
Japan -8.60 0.74 2.21 -0.12 4.94 -0.33 4.64 -0.30 -9.11 0.79 6.29 -0.42 6.64 -0.45 5.23 -0.34 
Russia 0.66 -0.48 -0.18 -0.06 -23.58 9.69 -19.60 7.88 -1.74 0.38 -3.21 1.13 -8.97 3.37 -9.95 3.84 
Australia -21.74 5.03 -22.7 5.27 -22.56 5.22 -13.09 3.22 -22.27 5.16 -23.75 5.54 -23.57 5.49 -1.45 0.68 
United States -1.57 0.12 -4.88 0.40 -5.64 0.46 -4.64 0.36 -2.62 0.20 -7.62 0.64 -7.50 0.63 -2.85 0.20 
 Relative World Trade Shares – RWS (in % vs. BaU) 
 ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS ETS NETS 
EU-27 0.63 0.16 -0.25 0.22 1.07 0.07 0.84 0.06 1.81 -0.05 0.51 0.04 0.76 0.02 0.25 0.04 
Canada 32.35 1.87 47.05 0.05 51.35 -0.45 51.49 -0.50 31.19 1.93 53.87 -0.90 54.22 -0.93 51.31 -0.62 
Japan 40.97 0.27 46.30 -0.08 48.61 -0.22 48.15 -0.22 39.96 0.27 48.28 -0.28 48.69 -0.29 47.59 -0.27 
Russia 51.40 -0.77 50.14 -0.38 33.01 7.44 36.03 6.01 49.35 -0.09 47.12 0.59 43.18 2.43 42.27 2.79 
Australia 26.09 3.93 24.55 4.13 25.14 4.05 32.83 2.67 25.05 4.01 22.55 4.33 22.93 4.28 44.16 0.52 
United States 47.88 -0.16 45.06 -0.05 44.64 -0.04 44.15 -0.04 46.47 -0.14 42.15 0.02 42.34 0.02 43.89 -0.10 
 
